Can the United Nations Still Hold the World Together? The Crucial Questions Before UNGA 81
By WFY Bureau I World Politics
On 8 September 2026, representatives of 193 countries will return to the United Nations headquarters in New York for the opening of the eighty-first session of the General Assembly.
The annual gathering will produce speeches, declarations, bilateral meetings, carefully negotiated resolutions and the familiar spectacle of motorcades moving through Manhattan. World leaders will speak of peace, cooperation and shared responsibility. Some will condemn wars while defending their own military alliances. Others will demand respect for international law while interpreting that law according to national interest.
Behind the ceremony lies a question that can no longer be avoided: can the United Nations still hold the world together?
The organisation enters its eighty-first General Assembly under the theme “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations That Delivers for All.” The wording acknowledges the crisis directly. Trust has been lost. Transformation is already under way. Delivery has become uncertain.
The UN is confronting simultaneous wars, nuclear tensions, humanitarian emergencies, climate disruption, technological upheaval, rising debt and growing political hostility towards international institutions. Its Security Council is repeatedly paralysed by the veto. Its agencies are expected to respond to expanding needs while the organisation struggles with a severe financial crisis.
The question is not whether the United Nations is imperfect. It has always been imperfect. The more serious question is whether the institution created in 1945 can be adapted to a world that no longer resembles the one in which it was designed.
A World That Has Outgrown 1945
The United Nations emerged from the destruction of the Second World War. Its founders were determined to prevent another global conflict and to create a system through which states could resolve disputes, establish international norms and cooperate on problems that no nation could manage alone.
When the UN Charter came into force in October 1945, the organisation had 51 founding members. Much of Asia and Africa remained under colonial rule. China was poor and divided. India had not yet become independent. Germany and Japan were defeated powers. Nuclear weapons had just been used for the first time.
The Security Council reflected that moment.
Five countries received permanent membership and the power to veto substantive decisions: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Russia later inherited the Soviet seat. These five powers, commonly known as the P5, retained privileges unavailable to every other member.
The arrangement was never based on equality. It was based on power.
The founders believed that an international security system could not function without the participation of the strongest states. Giving them veto power was the price of keeping them inside the institution. A system that ignored great-power interests might have appeared more democratic, but it could have collapsed as the League of Nations had before it.
That compromise helped the UN survive the Cold War. It also embedded an imbalance that has grown increasingly difficult to defend.
Today, the organisation has 193 members. Africa contains 54 UN member states but has no permanent Security Council seat. Latin America and the Caribbean have none. India, now the world’s most populous country and one of its largest economies, remains outside the permanent category. Japan and Germany are major financial contributors but possess no permanent place at the Council’s central table.
The structure still gives special authority to the principal victors of a war that ended more than eight decades ago.
The General Assembly and the Limits of Equality
The General Assembly presents a different vision of the international system. Every member state has one vote, regardless of population, wealth, territory or military strength.
India and Iceland have one vote each. China and Costa Rica have one vote each. The United States and the Maldives formally meet as equals.
This principle gives small and developing countries a voice they would rarely possess in conventional power politics. It allows them to build coalitions, shape international norms and force issues onto the global agenda.
The Assembly has played an important role in decolonisation, human rights, development, racial equality, environmental protection and the creation of international legal standards. It elects members to UN bodies, approves budgets and provides a forum in which almost every recognised state can be heard.
Its weakness is that most General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding. The Assembly may reveal the moral or political opinion of the international community, but it cannot usually compel a state to change its behaviour.
This creates one of the UN’s central contradictions. The body in which the world is most equally represented has limited enforcement power. The body with the greatest authority over international peace and security is the least representative.
UNGA 81 will once again place these two realities inside the same building.
The Veto and the Politics of Paralysis
The veto is the most visible symbol of the UN’s institutional crisis.
A Security Council resolution may receive overwhelming support and still fail because one permanent member objects. The veto has been used by different powers to protect allies, defend strategic interests and prevent international action that might restrict their freedom.
The United States has repeatedly used it in matters involving Israel. Russia has used it on questions connected to Ukraine and Syria. China and Russia have blocked initiatives they regard as instruments of Western pressure. Western powers have defended the veto as a necessary part of the Charter while criticising its use by rivals.
Each permanent member can therefore condemn the obstruction of others without surrendering its own privilege.
In 2022, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 76/262, requiring it to meet within ten working days whenever a Security Council veto is exercised. The initiative was intended to increase transparency and force the vetoing country to explain its decision before the wider membership.
It created political scrutiny, but it did not prevent paralysis.
In an April 2026 statement, India noted that 24 vetoes had been cast on 20 draft resolutions since the General Assembly introduced the new debate mechanism. India also observed that seven draft resolutions were vetoed in 2024, the highest annual number since 1986. India’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations
September offers another immediate test. The Security Council is expected to confront disagreement over the monitoring of sanctions connected to Iran’s nuclear programme. Russia and China oppose efforts backed by Western powers to restore or expand the monitoring mechanism. The dispute will unfold as leaders gather for the General Assembly and as nuclear risk returns to the centre of global diplomacy. Reuters
The deeper problem is not that countries disagree. International institutions exist precisely because countries disagree.
The problem is that the Council’s rules allow disagreement among a few states to prevent the institution from acting on behalf of all.
India’s Argument for Reform
India’s demand for a permanent Security Council seat is not new. What has changed is the impatience with which New Delhi now presents its case.
India argues that the Council lacks legitimacy because it does not reflect contemporary political and economic realities. It points to its population, democratic system, economic size, peacekeeping contribution, diplomatic reach and role as a representative voice of the Global South.
India has served eight terms as an elected, non-permanent member of the Security Council. It has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations for decades and has lost soldiers in missions conducted under the UN flag. It also participates in development partnerships, humanitarian relief and international disaster response.
Yet India must still compete periodically for a temporary Council seat while countries with far smaller contemporary global roles retain permanent authority.
In July 2026, India launched its campaign for a non-permanent Security Council term in 2028–29 under the acronym SHANTI. The platform highlights peacekeeping, development partnerships and a rules-based international order. The campaign demonstrates India’s continued willingness to work through the existing system, even while arguing that the same system is fundamentally unequal.
India is part of the G4 alongside Brazil, Germany and Japan. All four support an expansion of permanent membership. African states have also demanded permanent representation, although disagreement over which countries should occupy the seats has complicated negotiations.
The most difficult question concerns the veto.
Should new permanent members receive it? Should the veto be limited? Should it be abolished? Should it be suspended in cases involving genocide or mass atrocities?
India’s present position is that new permanent members should receive the veto as long as the power continues to exist. New Delhi argues that expanding permanent membership without extending equal authority would create a second class of permanent members and preserve the existing hierarchy.
Critics respond that adding more veto-wielding countries could make the Council even less capable of action.
Both arguments contain truth. Expanding the veto may increase representation while worsening paralysis. Denying it to new members may enlarge the Council without genuinely redistributing power.
This is why reform has remained trapped for decades. Every plausible solution threatens someone’s advantage.
Why Reform Is Almost Designed to Fail
Changing the composition of the Security Council requires amending the UN Charter.
Under Article 108, an amendment must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the member states, including all five permanent members of the Security Council.
This means that the countries whose relative power would be reduced by reform possess the legal ability to prevent that reform.
Some permanent members publicly support adding particular countries. The United States has supported permanent membership for India, Japan and Germany at different times. France and the United Kingdom have expressed support for broader reform. Russia has backed greater representation for developing countries in principle. China supports a larger role for the Global South but remains reluctant about Japan and cautious about India.
General expressions of support are easier than agreement on a complete formula.
How many new seats should be created? Which regions should receive them? Should Africa receive two permanent seats? If so, which countries? Should there be permanent seats without vetoes? Should some seats rotate within regions? What happens to the status of small states?
A proposal capable of satisfying one coalition may alienate another.
The result has been an endless reform process in which almost everyone agrees that the Council is outdated but no agreement exists on what should replace it.
The UN’s Crisis Is Also Financial
Political legitimacy is not the organisation’s only concern. The UN is also experiencing a severe liquidity crisis.
Member states approve budgets but do not always pay their assessed contributions fully or on time. The United States is responsible for 22 per cent of the UN’s regular budget and has historically been its largest financial contributor. Delayed payments by a contributor of that size can create immediate institutional strain.
At the end of 2024, unpaid contributions stood at approximately $760 million. Hundreds of millions more in 2025 dues remained outstanding as the organisation prepared its 2026 budget.
Secretary-General António Guterres proposed reducing the 2026 regular budget by $577 million, bringing it to approximately $3.238 billion. The proposal included the elimination of more than 18 per cent of posts. Peacekeeping operations, which have a separate budget, have also faced reductions and uncertainty. United Nations budget report
A financial crisis changes what the UN can do. Vacant positions remain unfilled. Meetings are reduced. Reports are delayed. Humanitarian and political missions operate with fewer personnel. Peacekeeping deployments may shrink even when the underlying conflicts have not ended.
It is reasonable to demand that the UN become more efficient. Like every large institution, it contains duplication, cumbersome procedures and bureaucratic habits that resist change.
But efficiency cannot compensate indefinitely for unpaid bills.
An organisation cannot be expected to monitor conflicts, support refugees, coordinate disaster relief, investigate human-rights violations and assist development programmes while its members deny it predictable resources.
UN80: Reforming the Machinery
The UN80 Initiative was launched as the organisation reached its eightieth anniversary. It has since developed into a broader effort to make the UN more effective, coordinated and financially sustainable.
The initiative examines internal efficiency, the way mandates are implemented and possible structural changes across the wider UN system. Over decades, member states have given the organisation thousands of mandates through resolutions and decisions. Some overlap. Some are poorly funded. Some continue long after the circumstances that produced them have changed.
Revisiting those mandates is necessary. It is also politically sensitive.
Every programme has defenders. Every office has a history. Every mandate reflects a previous negotiation. What appears redundant from an administrative perspective may represent an issue for which smaller states fought for years to gain recognition.
Reform therefore cannot become a polite term for allowing wealthy contributors to decide which international responsibilities survive.
The UN itself acknowledges that UN80 will not, by itself, solve the liquidity crisis. Administrative reform can reduce costs and improve performance, but it cannot replace financial obligations that member states have agreed to meet. UN80 Initiative
The real test is whether reform strengthens the organisation’s ability to serve people or merely makes a weakened institution less expensive.
Choosing the Next Secretary-General
UNGA 81 will unfold during another important transition. António Guterres is due to complete his second term as Secretary-General at the end of 2026.
The selection of his successor will reveal much about the institution’s willingness to change.
By tradition, the position rotates informally among regional groups. There is widespread support for selecting a candidate from Latin America and the Caribbean. There is also growing pressure to appoint the first woman Secretary-General in the organisation’s history.
The General Assembly formally appoints the Secretary-General, but only after receiving a recommendation from the Security Council. This gives the permanent members decisive influence and allows any one of them to block a candidate.
Once again, the system places the will of the wider membership behind the preferences of the P5.
The next Secretary-General will inherit an organisation facing war, financial distress, institutional distrust and pressure for internal reform. The office requires diplomatic restraint, but excessive caution can make its occupant appear irrelevant. A Secretary-General who challenges major powers may gain moral authority while losing the cooperation needed to act.
The position has always involved this tension. The individual described by the Charter as the UN’s chief administrative officer is also expected to become the world’s most visible diplomatic conscience.
What the United Nations Still Does
Criticism of the UN often overlooks the work that continues far from the Security Council chamber.
UN agencies vaccinate children, support refugees, monitor elections, deliver food, coordinate disaster relief, protect cultural heritage, establish aviation standards, track disease outbreaks and assist governments with development programmes.
International cooperation is not limited to dramatic votes in New York. Much of it occurs quietly through technical agreements, shared data, humanitarian logistics and professional networks.
The UN has also provided language through which the world understands rights and responsibilities. Concepts such as crimes against humanity, sustainable development, refugee protection and universal human rights have gained global force partly through UN institutions.
The organisation does not always enforce these norms. It has nevertheless helped create them.
If the United Nations disappeared tomorrow, geopolitical rivalry would not disappear with it. Wars would not end. Powerful countries would not become more accountable. Smaller countries would lose one of the few forums in which they possess formal equality.
The choice is not between an imperfect United Nations and a perfectly effective alternative. No such alternative is waiting.
The realistic choice is between reforming multilateral cooperation and allowing it to weaken further.
What UNGA 81 Must Confront
The eighty-first General Assembly cannot resolve every structural problem. It can, however, demonstrate whether member states are prepared to move from ceremonial support for multilateralism towards measurable action.
First, Security Council reform must advance towards actual text-based negotiation. General statements about the need for representation are no longer sufficient. Countries must place concrete models on the table and explain where they are willing to compromise.
Second, the organisation requires reliable financing. States cannot demand effectiveness while treating assessed contributions as optional political donations.
Third, the UN must show that international law applies consistently. Selective outrage has damaged the credibility of both Western and non-Western powers. Civilian suffering cannot be judged differently according to the identity of the aggressor or the strategic value of the victim.
Fourth, the General Assembly must claim a stronger role when the Security Council is paralysed. It may not possess identical legal authority, but it can increase political pressure, demand explanations and create broader coalitions for action.
Fifth, the UN80 reform process must remain transparent. Efficiency is necessary, but programmes serving vulnerable populations should not be dismantled through opaque administrative decisions.
Finally, the selection of the next Secretary-General must be conducted with greater openness. The world deserves to know what candidates believe about war, human rights, the veto, institutional reform and the independence of the office.
Restoring Trust Requires Surrendering Advantage
The theme of UNGA 81 speaks of restoring trust. Trust, however, cannot be restored by language alone.
It requires powerful countries to accept rules even when those rules are inconvenient. It requires emerging powers to demonstrate that they seek a fairer system rather than merely a larger share of privilege. It requires wealthy states to pay what they owe. It requires international institutions to admit failure, remove duplication and listen to the people affected by their decisions.
Above all, it requires an acceptance that sovereignty in the twenty-first century cannot mean complete isolation from shared responsibility.
Pandemics cross borders. Financial crises spread between markets. Carbon emitted in one country affects coastlines in another. Artificial intelligence developed by a few companies may transform societies everywhere. Wars displace people far beyond the states in which they begin.
No country, however powerful, can manage these forces alone.
The United Nations was never designed to create harmony among nations. It was designed to make coexistence possible despite their differences.
That task remains essential.
When delegates gather beneath the great dome of the General Assembly Hall this September, they will not merely be defending an institution. They will be deciding whether international cooperation can still evolve before distrust, rivalry and paralysis make cooperation impossible.
The United Nations does not need another anniversary speech declaring that reform is overdue.
It needs countries willing to surrender enough immediate advantage to preserve a world in which rules, dialogue and collective action still mean something.
If they are unwilling, the UN may continue to exist in buildings, flags and ceremonies while losing the authority for which it was created.
If they are willing, UNGA 81 could become more than another annual gathering.
It could mark the moment when the world finally accepted that an institution built in 1945 must either change with history or be left behind by it.